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THE INTELLIGIBLE PRINCIPLE:  HOW IT 
BRIEFLY LIVED, WHY IT DIED, AND WHY IT 
DESPERATELY NEEDS REVIVAL IN 
TODAY’S ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 
MEAGHAN DUNIGAN† 
INTRODUCTION 
The nondelegation doctrine stands for the principle that the 
United States Constitution places limits on the kind and 
quantity of discretion that Congress can grant to other 
government actors.  For the last century, the nondelegation 
doctrine has rarely been invoked to strike down congressional 
delegation of legislative authority, as the United States Supreme 
Court has repeatedly deferred to Congress and administrative 
agencies instead of upholding constitutional principles.1  The 
current standard of review for nondelegation cases is the 
“intelligible principle,” first articulated by the Supreme Court in 
J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States.2  This standard 
mandates that so long as Congress sets forth an “intelligible 
principle to which the person or body authorized . . . is directed to 
conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of 
legislative power.”3  While the intelligible principle was initially 
established as a means of upholding the constitutional roots of 
nondelegation, decades of caselaw prove that this standard has 
become a veiled attempt by the Supreme Court to uphold 
congressional delegation not because it is consistent with 
constitutional principles, but because the alternative—striking 
† J.D. Candidate, 2017, St. John’s University School of Law. Special thanks to 
my dad, Byran Dunigan, for instilling in me a love of this Nation’s history and a 
passion for justice.  
1 See infra Section III.C. Only twice in the last century has the Supreme Court 
struck down congressional delegation of power using the nondelegation doctrine, 
both in the same year. See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); A.L.A. 
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
2 276 U.S. 394 (1928). 
3 Id. at 409. 
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down delegation—is not a viable option given the size and scope 
of today’s government, most notably the growth of administrative 
agencies which have largely assumed the role of legislators.4 
This Note addresses the flaws in the current intelligible 
principle standard and proposes a new three-part standard that 
would better revitalize the intelligible principle as it was first 
articulated almost a century ago.  This Note concedes that while 
legislative delegation in any form is a violation of the original 
meaning of the nondelegation doctrine,5 our society and the 
growth of administrative agencies removed any chance of having 
our laws created solely by Congress.6  What can happen, and 
what this Note proposes, is for the Supreme Court to adopt a new 
intelligible principle standard that scales back the amount of 
authority being placed in the hands of those outside Capitol Hill. 
Part I of this Note discusses the origins of congressional 
delegation and the constitutional principles that underlie the 
nondelegation doctrine.  Part II discusses the creation of the 
intelligible principle, from its inception in J.W. Hampton to 
subsequent cases in the 1930’s that defined the standard’s limits. 
Part III discusses the breakdown of the intelligible principle, 
from the growth of administrative agencies to three significant 
mistakes made by the Supreme Court that have effectively 
rendered the standard meaningless.  Finally, Part IV proposes a 
new three-part intelligible principle standard; a standard that 
recovers the original purpose of the nondelegation doctrine while 
also adapting to the immense changes that our government 
structure has undergone since the doctrine’s inception over 225 
years ago. 
I. THE ROOTS OF NONDELEGATION
The Vesting Clause of the United States Constitution states 
that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a 
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate 
and House of Representatives.”7  While the meaning of 
“legislative power” has been the subject of scholarly debate,8 its 
4 See infra Part III. 
5 See infra Part I. 
6 See infra note 96. 
7 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
8 Scholars Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule argue that the legislative power 
referred to in the Article I Vesting Clause is the ability of legislators to vote for laws. 
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general understanding comes from the father of the Federalist 
Papers, Alexander Hamilton.9  Hamilton defined legislative 
power as the power of making laws, or the right “to prescribe 
rules for the regulation of society.”10  Based on this 
understanding, the Article I Vesting Clause places the sole 
authority of lawmaking in the hands of Congress; as a 
consequence, the nondelegation doctrine holds Congress may not 
delegate its lawmaking authority to any other branch.  While 
rooted in the Vesting Clause, the importance of the 
nondelegation doctrine stems from two essential principles that 
have stood as constitutional underpinnings—the accountability 
of Congress to the people and the separation of powers doctrine. 
A. The Principles of Nondelegation
One of the most important functions of the nondelgation
doctrine is to maintain the accountability of the legislative 
branch.11  This principle is perhaps best articulated in the Second 
Treatise of Government, written by the seventeenth century 
English philosopher John Locke.12  Locke believed the legislature 
is “the supreme power” and that “no other person or 
organisation . . . can make edicts that have the force of 
law . . . unless they have been permitted to do this by the 
legislature that the public has chosen and appointed.”13  
Recognizing that the legislature derived its power from the 
people, Locke believed there were four important things a 
legislature could not do.14  Most notably, Locke believed the 
As they see it, the nondelegation doctrine means that “[n]either Congress nor its 
members may delegate to anyone else the authority to vote on federal statutes or to 
exercise other de jure powers of federal legislators.” Eric A. Posner & Adrian 
Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1723 
(2002). 
9 See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 33, 75 (Alexander Hamilton). 
10 THE FEDERALIST NO. 75, at 450 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961). 
11 Justice Harlan saw the importance in accountability to the people as a 
primary goal of nondelegation, writing that “it insures that the fundamental policy 
decisions in our society will be made not by an appointed official but by the body 
immediately responsible to the people.” Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 626 
(1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting in part). 
12 JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (Jonathan Bennett ed., 
2008) (1689). 
13 Id. at 134. 
14 Id. at 135. The first limit was that the legislature cannot have arbitrary 
power over the lives and fortunes of the people, but instead the rules they create 
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legislature should not have the “power to transfer to anyone else 
their authority to make laws.”15  Locke stressed the importance of 
the derivative power of legislative authority, believing that if the 
legislature were to give its lawmaking power to those outside the 
legislature, it would move from a body that creates laws to one 
that creates legislators.16  He proclaimed that if lawmaking 
authority fell into the hands of those not elected by the people, 
the legislature would not be held directly accountable for the 
laws created.  Therefore, if such laws were not well received by 
the public, the legislature could simply pass the blame onto the 
delegated parties.  Locke felt that this type of delegation would 
undermine the legislature’s function as the voice of the people 
and destroy any accountability at the hands of the elected 
officials.  Heavily influenced by Locke’s understanding of 
government, the United States Constitution’s nondelegation 
doctrine was intended to defend against this breakdown of 
legislative accountability. 
The second key principle of the nondelegation doctrine is to 
uphold the separation of powers doctrine implicit in the United 
States Constitution.17  James Madison stressed the importance of 
the separation of powers doctrine, writing that “[t]he 
accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, 
in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many . . . may justly 
be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”18  If members of 
the executive or judicial branch were allowed to take an active 
role in lawmaking, it would raise questions about whether the 
branches were intermingling in a way that jeopardizes the 
separation of powers.  The nondelegation doctrine was designed 
to protect against this intermingling by prohibiting the  
must conform to the laws of nature. Id. Second, the legislature cannot give itself 
power to rule by sudden, arbitrary decrees, but instead it must govern according to 
standing laws. Id. at 136. Third, the legislature cannot take any part of a man’s 
property without his consent. Id. at 138. 
15 Id. at 141. 
16 Id. 
17 The Constitution contains no provision expressly calling for the separation of 
powers between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. However, the 
Constitution has long been held to require the separation of powers as vital to 
maintaining governmental order. 
18 THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 301 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
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delegation of legislative authority, thereby ensuring that the 
federal government would be unable to consolidate its power to 
the detriment of its citizens. 
B. The Importance of Nondelegation
The principles of the nondelegation doctrine are vital not
only to upholding the Constitution, but also to ensuring that our 
government functions as the republic the Nation’s forefather’s 
intended.19  However, for decades, opponents of the doctrine have 
argued that nondelegation simply is not a viable option in today’s 
society.20  Some scholars argue that the nondelegation doctrine 
has been misinterpreted from its inception, and that the 
delegation of legislative authority is actually consistent with the 
Constitution.21  Others argue that while the doctrine exists, its 
revival would have no effect on improving the current 
administrative state.22 
This Note does not debate the merits of the nondelegation 
doctrine.  Instead, this Note accepts that the nondelegation 
doctrine exists, and that the principles justifying it are essential 
to upholding the values of the Constitution.  However, what this 
Note does seek to do is shed light on the deficiencies in the 
current nondelegation standard.  The United States Supreme 
Court has increasingly allowed an intermingling of power 
between the legislative and executive branch, which has 
undermined both the principles of accountability and separation 
of powers that nondelegation was designed to protect.  As a 
result, the nondelegation doctrine stands as an unenforceable 
19 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 82 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961) (describing the difference between a republic and a democracy and how the 
United States is a republic, which Madison defined as “the delegation of 
government . . . to a small number of citizens elected by the rest”). 
20 See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 
HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1694–97 (1975) (arguing that stricter enforcement of the 
nondelegation doctrine would “clearly be unwise” because calling for more detailed 
legislative specification of policies is “neither feasible nor desirable”); David B. 
Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State, 89 GEO. 
L.J. 97 (2000) (arguing why public choice would support delegating legislative
authority to unelected agency officials).
21 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 8, at 1723–25. 
22 See Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 321 
(2000) (“[I]t is far from clear that a large-scale judicial revival of the nondelegation 
doctrine would do anything to improve the operation of the regulatory state. It may 
well make things worse, possibly much worse.”). 
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doctrine, as the current intelligible principle standard is a 
hollowed shell compared to its original inception.  This Note 
proposes a reformulation of the intelligible principle that both 
upholds constitutional principles and ensures society can operate 
given today’s complex government structure. 
II. THE CREATION OF THE INTELLIGIBLE PRINCIPLE
While the principles of nondelegation are rooted in ideals 
that form the foundation of our republic, the unfortunate truth is 
that the nondelegation doctrine began crumbling within two 
decades of the ratification of the United States Constitution.  As 
a result, the intelligible principle was adopted to enforce the 
decaying doctrine by ensuring that Congress was not delegating 
its legislative authority in a manner inconsistent with the 
Constitution.  However, over the past eighty years, the 
intelligible principle has become a meaningless phrase used by 
the United States Supreme Court to justify the delegation of 
virtually unrestricted legislative authority to administrative 
agencies.  Consequently, the current intelligible principle 
standard is riddled with gaps that must be filled.  In order to fill 
these gaps, the first step is to trace how nondelegation took its 
current shape. 
A. Conditional Legislation
The Supreme Court’s first nondelegation case was Cargo of
Brig Aurora v. United States,23 decided in 1813.  After the 
expiration of the Non-Intercourse Act of 1809, Congress passed 
an updated version of the Act in 1811 that restricted trade with 
France and Great Britain.24  The statute gave the President 
authority to lift the trade embargo against either country if he 
declared that the country had stopped violating the neutral 
trading power of the United States.25  Challenged for giving the 
President a role in the legislative process, the Court held that 
this type of delegation to the President was permissible since it 
was Congress, not the President, who actually created the law.26  
The President’s role was simply to make the factual 
23 11 U.S. 382 (1813). 
24 Id. at 388. 
25 Id. at 383. 
26 Id. at 386. 
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determination as to whether the law would go into effect.  Known 
as “conditional legislation,”27 this type of delegation became the 
first standard by which nondelegation was measured. 
In terms of upholding the principles of the nondelegation 
doctrine, conditional legislation fell in line with keeping 
accountability in the hands of Congress and maintaining the 
separation of powers between Congress and the Executive.28  The 
Court elaborated on conditional legislation as a means of 
congressional delegation in 1892, when it decided Marshall Field 
& Co. v. Clark.29  In Field, Congress passed the Tariff Act of 
1890, known today as the McKinley Tariff, which authorized the 
President to suspend those provisions of the Tariff Act that 
permitted the free importation of goods if the President 
determined that a country imposed duties that were “reciprocally 
unequal and unreasonable.”30  Among other things, the Act was 
challenged as granting the President impermissible legislative 
authority.31  Writing for the Court, Justice Harlan stated: 
The true distinction . . . is between the delegation of power to 
make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what 
it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its 
execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. 
The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be 
made.32 
The Court held that the Act was a permissible delegation of 
authority to the President.33  The Court reasoned that 
“[l]egislative power was exercised when congress declared that 
the suspension should take effect upon a named contingency,” 
and that the President “was the mere agent of the law-making 
department to ascertain and declare the event upon which its 
expressed will was to take effect.”34  The Court’s holding, 
combined with Justice Harlan’s examination into what 
27 Also referred to as the “named contingency” test. See WILLIAM F. FUNK, 
SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & RUSSELL L. WEAVER, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND 
PRACTICE: PROBLEMS AND CASES 546–47 (5th ed. 2014). 
28 See Justice Clarence Thomas’ concurring opinion in Department of 
Transportation v. Association of American Railroads, infra Section IV.B. 
29 143 U.S. 649 (1892). 
30 Id. at 680. 
31 Id. at 681. 
32 Id. at 693–94 (quoting Cincinnati, Wilmington & Zanesville R.R. Co. v. 
Comm’rs of Clinton Cty., 1 Ohio St. 77, 88–89 (1852)). 
33 Id. at 690–91. 
34 Id. at 693. 
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constitutes a permissible delegation, shows that the only 
permissible authority Congress may grant the Executive is in the 
form of conditional legislation, and not the delegation of pure 
lawmaking. 
While there is an argument to be made that the Field Court 
extended conditional legislation beyond what the Court in Brig 
Aurora had intended,35 Field remained outside the realm of 
delegating pure legislative authority to the executive. 
Nevertheless, heading into the twentieth century, the nature of 
government was changing, beginning with the Interstate 
Commerce Act of 188736 and the growth of the administrative 
state under the New Deal.37  With the creation of agencies and 
commissions that fell under the executive branch, Congress 
began delegating more authority that pushed beyond conditional 
legislation, paving the way for the Court to establish the 
intelligible principle as the new standard to measure 
congressional delegation. 
B. Birth of the Intelligible Principle
The intelligible principle was first articulated in J.W.
Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States,38 opening the door to a new 
era of nondelegation jurisprudence.  J.W. Hampton involved a 
challenge to the so-called “flexible tariff provision” within the 
Tariff Act of 1922.39  The provision authorized the President to fix 
certain rates of goods if the President determined that the 
current rates did not equal the difference between the cost of  
production in the United States and foreign countries.40  To make 
that determination, Congress laid out four considerations41 that 
35 Unlike in Brig Aurora, which only authorized the President to determine 
whether or not France or Great Britain stopped violating the neutral trading power 
of the United States, the statute in Field was more discretionary because it allowed 
the President to determine whether the duties levied by other countries were 
“unequal and unreasonable.” This difference, though minor, is an important step to 
understanding the current scope of congressional delegation and the intelligible 
principle. See also Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 
327, 362–65 (2002). 
36 See David Casazza, Note, Liberty Requires Accountability: Checking 
Delegations to Independent Agencies, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 729, 737 (2015). 
37 See infra Part III, notes 71–72 and accompanying text. 
38 276 U.S. 394 (1928). 
39 Id. at 400. 
40 Id. at 400–01. 
41 The four considerations were:  
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the President would use, and also mandated that the United 
States Tariff Commission conduct an investigation before any 
proclamation could be issued.42 
J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co challenged this provision, arguing 
that it was an invalid delegation of legislative authority to the 
President.43  The United States. Supreme Court, in a unanimous 
decision, held that the flexible tariff provision was a permissible 
delegation of authority to the President.44  The Court found that 
Congress had clearly defined a policy and plan, and the authority 
given to the President was merely to determine differences in 
rates to comply with that underlying policy and plan.45  The 
Court did not view the President’s authority as an exercise of 
delegation of legislative power.  Instead, the Court viewed the 
President’s authority as a means “to secure the exact effect 
intended by its acts of legislation, by vesting discretion in such 
officers to make public regulations interpreting a statute and 
directing the details of its execution . . . .”46  Based on this 
analysis, Justice Taft concluded that “[i]f Congress shall lay 
down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the 
person or body authorized [to act] is directed to conform, such 
legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative 
power.”47 
Based on the Court’s rationale, the intelligible principle 
requires Congress to clearly articulate a “policy and plan” and 
allows Congress to grant the executive the authority to execute 
that plan upon consideration of various factors.  While 
theoretically the intelligible principle seems to align with 
conditional legislation because it empowers the executive to 
(1) the differences in conditions in production, including wages, costs of
material, and other items in costs of production of such or similar articles
in the United States and in competing foreign countries; (2) the differences
in the wholesale selling prices of domestic and foreign articles in the
principal markets of the United States; (3) advantages granted to a foreign
producer by a foreign government, or by a person, partnership, corporation,
or association in a foreign country; and (4) any other advantages or
disadvantages in competition.
Id. at 401–02. 
42 Id. at 402. 
43 Id. at 404. 
44 Id. at 410–11. 
45 Id. at 404–05. 
46 Id. at 406. 
47 Id. at 409. 
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implement a plan already established by Congress; in reality, the 
intelligible principle, as it was first articulated, actually 
permitted Congress to delegate purely legislative power.48  
Unlike in Field, where the President was only making a factual 
determination as to whether certain goods should have rates that 
were already prescribed by Congress, in J.W. Hampton, the 
President was not only determining whether current rates were 
unequal, but also what those rates should be.49  While the Court 
itself maintained that the President’s action was the mere 
execution of an existing statute, the Court went on to state that 
“[i]f Congress were to be required to fix every rate, it would be 
impossible to exercise the power at all.”50  This suggests that, for 
practical reasons, the Court will allow Congress to delegate 
legislative authority to the executive.  Therefore, the main 
purpose in establishing the intelligible principle was to ensure 
that such delegation was not too excessive. 
C. Shaping the Limits of the Intelligible Principle
In the decade following J.W. Hampton, the Supreme Court
decided two important nondelegation cases that solidified the 
intelligible principle as the standard to measure congressional 
delegation and helped define the standard’s limits.  In Panama 
Refining Co. v. Ryan,51 the Court struck down a provision of the 
National Industry Recovery Act (“Recovery Act”) in which 
Congress authorized the President to prohibit the transportation 
of petroleum products.52  In striking down the provision, the 
Court pointed out three criteria to be considered when 
determining whether there has been an unlawful delegation of 
legislative authority: “whether the Congress has declared a policy 
with respect to that subject; whether the Congress has set up a 
standard for the President’s action; [and] whether the Congress 
has required any finding by the President in the exercise of the  
48 The Court’s biggest failure in J.W. Hampton was that it viewed the 
President’s action as mere execution of an existing statute guided by an intelligible 
principle, when in reality it was granting the President the power to make laws. 
49 See Lawson, supra note 35, at 367–68. 
50 J.W. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 407. 
51 293 U.S. 388 (1935). 
52 Id. at 405. 
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authority to enact the prohibition.”  The Court went on to find 
that none of the three criteria existed in the Recovery Act 
provision.53 
First, the Court determined that Congress did not lay out a 
policy initiative with respect to transporting petroleum, but 
instead gave the President “unlimited authority to determine the 
policy and to lay down the prohibition, or not to lay it down, as he 
may see fit.”54  Second, the Court found that the provision 
“establishes no creterion [sic] to govern the President’s course.”55  
Third, the Court determined that the provision required no 
“finding by the President as a condition of his action.”56  As a 
result, the Court struck down the provision as an impermissible 
delegation of legislative authority.57 
The three-part standard articulated in Panama Refining 
Co.—although not explicitly stated by the Court as a three-part 
standard—gave meaningful boundaries to the intelligible 
principle beyond what was first articulated in J.W. Hampton.  
Not only does Congress need to set forth a policy and plan to 
which the President’s actions must conform, but Congress must 
also mandate that a certain condition exists before the President 
can take action.  The impact of grafting conditional legislation 
into the intelligible principle was significant because it 
strengthened the constitutionality of the standard by ensuring 
that the President would not have the sole ability to create laws 
at his discretion, thus promoting both legislative accountability 
and the separation of powers. 
Four months after Panama Refining Co., the Court struck 
down a second provision of the Recovery Act in A.L.A. Schechter 
Poultry Corp. v. United States.58  The provision at issue 
authorized the President to approve codes of “fair competition” 
among trade and industry associations after making a 
determination that the suggested codes “impose[d] no inequitable 
restrictions on admission to membership and [we]re truly 
representative.”59  Additionally, the provision allowed the 
President to impose conditions that he “deem[ed] necessary to 




57 Id. at 430. 
58 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935). 
59 Id. at 538. 
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effectuate the policy herein declared.”60  The Court held that this 
provision was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power 
because “the discretion of the President in approving or 
prescribing codes . . . [wa]s virtually unfettered.”61  While the 
provision seemingly invoked conditional legislation by requiring 
the President to make certain findings about the codes before 
approving them, the Court found that the provision “supplie[d] 
no standards”62 and any restrictions left “virtually untouched the 
field of policy” that was envisioned by the underlying statute, 
making the President’s findings “really but a statement of an 
opinion.”63 
Again, the Court did not directly invoke the intelligible 
principle when striking down the provision in A.L.A. Schechter 
Poultry. However, the Court compared the flexible tariff 
provision in J.W. Hampton with the Recovery Act provision in 
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry, stating how the provision in J.W.
Hampton clearly limited the delegation of legislative power,
while the provision in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry supplied no
standards for the President’s “legislative undertaking.”64
Drawing upon J.W. Hampton and Panama Refining Co., the
Court provided more insight into what it considers when
determining whether there is an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative authority.65  As in Panama Refining Co., the Court
referenced conditional legislation when it noted that the
President’s ability to approve codes could only occur after he
determined the codes were fair.66  However, the Court found
issue with this type of conditional legislation because the
President was not making a factual determination, but rather a
discretionary finding, as the term “fair” has no real measurable
bounds.67  Additionally, the Court’s holding called for Congress to
60 Id. at 523. The policy goals of the Recovery Act were the rehabilitation, 
correction, and expansion of trades and industries, and only one specifically called 
for the Act “to eliminate unfair competitive practices . . . .” Id. at 535. 
61 Id. at 542. 
62 Id. at 541. 
63 Id. at 538. 
64 Id. at 541–42. 
65 Id. at 537–38. 
66 Id. at 538–39. 
67 Id. Compared to the conditional legislation in Brig Aurora and Field, the 
discretionary finding that needed to occur before the President could approve the 
codes in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry could not be measured by a numerical standard or 
a clear determination of whether a violation of an existing statute occurred. 
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articulate clear standards by which the President is to exercise 
his delegated authority, and that any delegation of authority that 
extended beyond the policy goals underlying the statute was 
impermissible.68 
Both Panama Refining Co. and A.L.A. Schechter Poultry 
provide meaningful insight into the intelligible principle. 
Unfortunately, this insight has largely been dismissed based on 
the notion that the Court struck down congressional delegation 
in the 1930’s solely because of the tension that existed between 
the Court and President Roosevelt.69  The fact that the Court has 
not invalidated a statute as an unconstitutional delegation of 
legislative authority to the executive branch since 1935 largely 
supports this assertion.70  Instead, the Court has repeatedly 
stretched the meaning of the intelligible principle beyond what 
was originally defined in J.W. Hampton, Panama Refining Co., 
and A.L.A. Schechter Poultry, taking the life out of nondelegation 
jurisprudence. 
68 The Court found that the policy goals were too broad and gave no direction to 
the President when determining whether or not to approve the codes. Id. 534–35. 
69 See David Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court Give It 
Substance?, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1223, 1237 n.86 (1985); FUNK, SHAPIRO & WEAVER, 
supra note 27, at 549–50 (discussing that although President Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt’s infamous Court Packing Plan to alter the composition of the Court was 
unsuccessful, “it is widely viewed as prompting a shift in the Court’s jurisprudence 
on a variety of issues,” including the Court’s adoption of a “more expansive position 
regarding Congress’ power to delegate authority”). 
70 However, the Court did strike down a delegation of legislative authority to 
private entities in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 278 (1936). In Carter 
Coal, Congress passed the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act, which established a 
commission to create new competition standards. Id. at 310–11. Members of the 
commission were selected based on the amount of coal they produced in relation to 
the national average. Id. at 281–82. The Supreme Court held that Congress’ 
delegation of authority to the commission was unconstitutional because it conferred 
power not to an official body “but to private persons whose interests may be and 
often are adverse to the interests of others in the same business.” Id. at 311. While 
the Court struck down the delegation by citing to the Fifth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause, the nondelegation doctrine loomed largely in the background of the 
decision, with the Court calling Congress’ actions “legislative delegation in its most 
obnoxious form.” Id. The nondelegation doctrine in relation to private entities still 
remains a pillar of the original understanding of the doctrine: that Congress may not 
delegate any legislative authority. 
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III. THE BREAKDOWN OF THE INTELLIGIBLE PRINCIPLE
At the time J.W. Hampton was decided, the United Sates 
was just eighteen months away from the Stock Market Crash of 
1929, the beginning of the Great Depression, and FDR’s New 
Deal.71  These events signaled a change in the government’s role 
in regulating society and played a large role in why the 
intelligible principle was so short-lived as an enforced standard 
of nondelegation jurisprudence. 
Most notably, there was a massive growth of administrative 
agencies that fell under the authority of the executive branch 
during the New Deal.72  Administrative agencies undertake 
various policy and lawmaking functions that were once reserved 
for the legislature, adding an additional layer of bureaucracy 
between Congress, who enacts a statute, and the President to 
whom the statute delegates the authority.  This additional layer 
undermines one of the key purposes of the nondelegation 
doctrine: maintaining accountability.73  However, while the 
growth of administrative agencies posed a serious threat to the 
nondelegation doctrine and its purposes, neither Congress nor 
the United States Supreme Court actively sought to uphold the 
doctrine and follow the intelligible principle.  Instead, Congress 
began delegating large quantities of legislative authority to 
administrative agencies, and the Court repeatedly upheld these 
delegations under the guise of the intelligible principle.74  In 
71 The Stock Market Crash of 1929 occurred on October 4, 1929 and J.W. 
Hampton was decided on April 9, 1928. 
72 See Casazza, supra note 36, at 737 n.43. 
73 In his Note, Liberty Requires Accountability: Checking Delegations to 
Independent Agencies, David Casazza discusses extensively the political 
accountability issue with administrative agencies. In the context of nondelegation, 
Casazza writes that “[t]he commitment to nondelegation proceeds from the people's 
decision to place political power in the legislature. . . . When Congress delegates its 
policymaking power to an agency, the power of making laws passes out of the hands 
of those to whom the people have entrusted it.” Id. at 737, 742, 746. 
74 There are cases in which the Court does not explicitly cite to the intelligible 
principle when discussing nondelegation but, based on the cases the Court cites to in 
determining whether there has a permissible delegation, it becomes apparent that 
the intelligible principle is being invoked. See, e.g., Skinner v. Mid-American 
Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212, 218–19 (1989) (referring to Mistretta v. United States and 
American Power & Light Co. v. Securities & Exchange Commission to define the 
nondelegation doctrine and its principles); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 
555, 604 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (referencing Touby v. United States and 
American Power & Light Co. v. Securities & Exchange Commission when discussing 
the Court upholding delegations under broad terms). 
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particular, there have been three major ways in which the Court 
has contributed to the breakdown of the intelligible principle. 
First, the Court upheld broad policy objectives and unlimited 
authority.75  Second, the Court inaccurately rearticulated the 
intelligible principle in Mistretta v. United States,76 and revived 
the standard in a manner inconsistent with the original meaning.  
Third, the Court removed the requirement of conditional 
legislation as a requirement of the intelligible principle.77  In 
turn, a series of nondelegation cases illustrate that, as the 
decades progressed, the Court became more lax in its application 
of the intelligible principle, ultimately leading to the breakdown 
of the intelligible principle as a meaningful standard to measure 
congressional delegation. 
A. Upholding Broad Policy Objectives and Boundless Agency
Authority
The Supreme Court’s first misstep in its application of the
intelligible principle came just seven years after it struck down 
congressional delegation in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry.  In 
National Broadcasting Co. v. United States,78 the Court examined 
the authority delegated to the Communications Commission in 
the Communications Act of 1934.  The Communications 
Commission was authorized to adopt regulations for radio 
broadcasting “as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of 
th[e] Act,”79 namely to create regulations that were in the “public 
interest, convenience, or necessity.”80  The Court held that this 
“public interest” policy objective was “a criterion which ‘is as 
concrete as the complicated factors for judgment in such a field of 
delegated authority permit.’ ”81  This newly-created public  
75 See generally Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943); Yakus v. 
United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944); Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90 
(1946). 
76 488 U.S. 361 (1989). 
77 See infra Section III.C. 
78 319 U.S. 190 (1943). 
79 Id. at 217. 
80 Id. at 193–94. 
81 Id. at 216 (quoting Fed. Commc’ns Comm. v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 
134, 138 (1940)). 
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interest standard, while seemingly ambiguous, was upheld in 
various forms as a sufficient policy objective under the 
intelligible principle.82 
Then in Yakus v. United States,83 the Court upheld the 
Emergency Price Control Act during World War II, which created 
the Office of Price Administration headed by a presidentially-
appointed Price Administrator.84  The Act stated that the Price 
Administrator was to establish “fair and equitable” prices that 
reflected the Act’s purpose as a wartime measure to stabilize 
prices.85  The Court found the Act to be a permissible delegation 
of legislative power because Congress “stated the legislative 
objective, . . . prescribed the method of achieving that objective—
maximum price fixing—and . . . laid down standards to guide the 
administrative determination of both the occasions for the 
exercise of the price-fixing power, and the particular prices to be 
established.”86  While stabilizing wartime prices was a narrower 
policy objective than the public interest standard, the Price 
Administrator had broad discretion on how to reach that 
objective.  Establishing “fair and equitable” prices is similarly 
broad compared to creating “codes of fair competition,” language 
that the Court struck down for being too discretionary in A.L.A. 
Schechter Poultry.  This contrary result in Yakus demonstrates 
the Court was moving away from its original understanding of 
the intelligible principle and allowing Congress to delegate more 
authority to administrative agencies. 
Another example of broad congressional delegation is found 
in American Power & Light Co. v. Securities & Exchange 
Commission.87 There, Congress passed the Public Utility Holding 
Company Act, giving the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”) the authority to ensure that the holding company system 
did not “‘unduly or unnecessarily complicate the structure’ or 
82 See, e.g., Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co. 320 U.S. 591, 611 (1944) 
(upholding delegation to the Federal Power Commission to fix “just and reasonable 
rates” for natural gas prices that were “consistent with the maintenance of adequate 
service in the public interest”); Fed. Commc’ns Comm. v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 
U.S. 134, 137–38 (1940) (upholding the Communications Commission’s authority to 
create a regulatory system that grants or denies licenses based on “public 
convenience, interest or necessity”). 
83 321 U.S. 414 (1944). 
84 Id. at 419. 
85 Id. at 420. 
86 Id. at 423. 
87 329 U.S. 90 (1946). 
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‘unfairly or inequitably distribute voting power among security 
holders.’ ”88  These phrases were challenged as impermissible 
delegations for being undefined and having no meaning.89  The 
Court upheld these phrases as sufficient delegations, and in 
doing so articulated what seemed to be a new standard for the 
intelligible principle.  The Court stated that delegations of 
legislative authority were sufficient so long as Congress laid out 
(1) a general policy, (2) “the public agency which is to apply” the
policy, and (3) “the boundaries of this delegated authority.”90  As
in Yakus, the Court found that the terms “unfair and
inequitable” were sufficient boundaries by which the SEC could
implement regulations.91  In American Power & Light Co., the
Court justified such broad discretionary terms by stating that the
terms “reflect[] . . . the necessities of modern legislation dealing
with complex economic and societal problems.”92  This
justification illustrated how the Court recognized that it was not
staying true to the original meaning of the intelligible principle,
an unfortunate mistake that had an immense impact on
nondelegation jurisprudence.
The Court’s decisions in National Broadcasting Co., Yakus, 
and American Power & Light Co. stripped the intelligible 
principle so far down that within two decades of its creation the 
standard had lost its original meaning.  Subsequent courts rarely 
even invoked the words “intelligible principle,” and those that did 
often cited to the standards set forth in American Power & Light 
Co. to determine whether the delegation satisfied the intelligible 
principle.93  While it is not clear that the J.W. Hampton Court 
demanded that Congress articulate a specific “policy and plan,” 
the Court’s subsequent use of the intelligible principle to strike 
88 Id. at 104. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 105. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 See, e.g., Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 771 (1996) (using National 
Broadcasting Co. as its standard and admitting that the Court has upheld 
“delegations under standards phrased in sweeping terms”); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 
U.S. 714, 720 (1986) (using Yakus as a standard); Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. 
Am. Petrol. Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685–86 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (citing 
American Power & Light Co. and the broad policy objectives upheld by the Court); 
Fed. Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 560 (1976); Lichter v. 
United States, 334 U.S. 742, 785 (1948) (citing American Power & Light Co. in 
discussing how the Court should interpret the standards set forth by Congress). 
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down delegations in Panama Refining Co. and A.L.A. Schechter 
Poultry because they were too discretionary demonstrates that 
specificity was a required element of the original intelligible 
principle.  Therefore, the Court’s upholding of broad policy 
objectives and boundless agency authority is a major contribution 
to the breakdown of the intelligible principle for several reasons. 
First, how the Court could repeatedly come to the conclusion 
that the phrase “public interest” is a concrete policy objective to 
guide an agency is something that puzzled even Justice Scalia, 
who, in his dissenting opinion in Mistretta v. United States, posed 
the question: “What legislated standard, one must wonder, can 
possibly be too vague to survive judicial scrutiny, when we have 
repeatedly upheld, in various contexts, a ‘public interest’ 
standard?”94  This standard has effectively allowed Congress to 
grant administrative agencies the authority to create any rules 
they deem to be in the public interest, solely relying on the 
agency’s own views and policy agenda rather than requiring 
Congress to set forth objective guidelines. 
A second problem with the Court upholding broad policy 
objectives and delegations that give unlimited amounts of 
legislative authority to agencies is the manner in which the 
Court justifies its decisions.  The Court never upholds phrases 
such as “public interest,” “just and reasonable rates,” “unfair 
methods of competition,” or “relevant factors” by showing how 
and why these broad terms are consistent with the original 
meaning of the intelligible principle or the nondelegation 
doctrine.  Instead, the Court simply states that because the 
Court has upheld similarly broad phrases in the past, the current 
delegation should also survive a nondelegation challenge.95  
Additionally, the Court justifies these broad standards by 
blaming the state of society; namely, the growth of the 
administrative state.96  While this may be a legitimate argument 
94 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
95 See id., 488 U.S. at 374 (majority opinion) (“In light of our approval of these 
broad delegations, we harbor no doubt that Congress’ delegation of authority to the 
Sentencing Commission is sufficiently specific and detailed to meet constitutional 
requirements.”); Loving, 517 U.S. at 771 (admitting that since 1935 “we have since 
upheld, without exception, delegations under standards phrased in sweeping 
terms”). 
96 See, e.g., Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372 (“[O]ur jurisprudence has been driven by a 
practical understanding that in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever 
changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an 
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in favor of giving administrative agencies more legislative 
authority, it does not justify the breadth of authority that the 
Court has upheld under the nondelegation doctrine.  In fact, an 
argument can be made that the growth of today’s administrative 
state is in part a result of the Court upholding broad delegations 
to agencies by Congress, enabling the creation of more agencies 
to relieve Congress of its duties in favor of bureaucrats. 
Therefore, the Court’s upholding of broad policy objectives and 
unlimited boundaries of agency authority was a major 
contribution to the breakdown of the intelligible principle 
because it allowed agencies to exercise too much discretion and 
repudiated the original understanding of the intelligible 
principle. 
B. The Inaccurate Rearticulation of the Intelligible Principle
The second way the Court contributed to the breakdown of
the intelligible principle was by adopting the three requirements 
outlined in American Power & Light Co. as the intelligible 
principle standard in Mistretta v. United States.97  In Mistretta, 
the Court had to determine whether Congress delegated 
excessive authority to the United States Sentencing Commission 
in tasking the agency with creation of new sentencing 
guidelines.98  In the underlying statute, “Congress charged the 
[Sentencing] Commission with three goals . . . specified four 
‘purposes’ of sentencing that the Commission must pursue in 
carrying out its mandate” and “prescribed the specific tool—the 
guidelines system—for the Commission to use in regulating 
sentencing.”99  The Court held that the goals and standards 
articulated by the statute satisfied the intelligible principle.100  In 
describing the requirements of the intelligible principle, the 
ability to delegate power under broad general directives.”); United States v. Robel, 
389 U.S. 258, 274 (1967) (“Delegation of power under general directives is an 
inevitable consequence of our complex society, with its myriad, ever changing, highly 
technical problems.”); Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Adm’r of Wage and Hour Div. of 
Dep’t of Labor, 312 U.S. 126, 145 (1941) (“In an increasingly complex society 
Congress obviously could not perform its functions if it were obliged to find all the 
facts subsidiary to the basic conclusions which support the defined legislative 
policy . . . .”). 
97 Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372–73. 
98 Id. at 370. 
99 Id. at 374. 
100 Id. at 371–74. 
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Court quoted its decision in American Power & Light Co., stating 
that it is “constitutionally sufficient if Congress clearly delineates 
the general policy, the public agency which is to apply it, and the 
boundaries of this delegated authority.”101 
Following Mistretta, the Court continued to uphold 
congressional delegations under the broad terms of American 
Power & Light Co.  In Touby v. United States,102 Congress 
authorized the Attorney General to classify various drugs as 
controlled substances for purposes of criminal drug enforcement 
if doing so was “necessary to avoid an imminent hazard to the 
public safety.”103  The Court upheld this standard as being 
consistent with the intelligible principle by pointing out the 
Court’s history of upholding delegations of authority to establish 
“fair and equitable” prices or rules in the “public interest.”104  “In 
light of these precedents,” the Court declared, “one cannot 
plausibly argue that [the statute]’s ‘imminent hazard to the 
public safety’ standard is not an intelligible principle.”105  Ten 
years later, the Court decided Whitman v. American Trucking 
Ass’ns,106 which was an important case in nondelegation 
jurisprudence because it was the first time Justice Thomas 
articulated his concerns about whether the intelligible principle 
is an appropriate standard to measure congressional 
delegation.107  Whitman involved a challenge to a provision of the 
Clean Air Act, which authorized the Environmental Protection 
Agency (“EPA”) to create air quality standards at a level 
“requisite to protect the public health.”108  The District of 
Columbia Court of Appeals previously held that the provision 
was an unconstitutional delegation of authority because 
101 Id. at 372–73 (quoting Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 
(1946)). Justice Scalia, the lone dissenter, criticized, among other things, the Court’s 
repeated upholding of the public interest standard as a sufficient policy objective. Id. 
at 416 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
102 500 U.S. 160 (1991). 
103 Id. at 162–63. 
104 Id. at 165 (first citing Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426–27 (1944); 
and then citing Nat’l Broad. Co., v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225–26 (1943)). 
105 Id. 
106 531 U.S. 457 (2001). 
107 See id. at 487 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I am not convinced that the 
intelligible principle doctrine serves to prevent all cessions of legislative 
power. . . . On a future day, however, I would be willing to address the question 
whether our delegation jurisprudence has strayed too far from our Founders’ 
understanding of separation of powers.”). 
108 Id. at 465 (majority opinion). 
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Congress had failed to set forth an intelligible principle.109  
However, the Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the term 
“requisite” meant “sufficient, but not more than necessary,” and 
holding that the scope of discretion was a permissible delegation 
under various nondelegation precedents.110 
The Court’s rearticulation of the intelligible principle in 
Mistretta, using the requirements from American Power & Light 
Co., was a major contribution to the breakdown of the intelligible 
principle because it completely removed the original meaning of 
the intelligible principle that was developed by J.W. Hampton, 
Panama Refining Co., and A.L.A. Schechter Poultry.  By 
solidifying general policy objectives as a requirement of the 
intelligible principle, the Court gave administrative agencies the 
ability to define the scope of these objectives with virtually no 
pushback.  Additionally, while the third requirement from 
American Power & Light Co. calls for Congress to delineate 
boundaries of authority, the subsequent case law following 
Mistretta illustrates that Congress did not actually need to 
include quantifiable boundaries.111  In both Touby and Whitman, 
the Court upheld the terms “necessary” and “requisite” as 
sufficient limits on authority as both are extremely discretionary 
terms that do not give agencies any real guidance. 
Additionally, the rearticulation of the intelligible principle in 
Mistretta occurred four years after the Court adopted its policy of 
Chevron deference to administrative agencies.112  For the 
purposes of this Note, the Chevron doctrine can be simplified into 
the idea of administrative deference when Congress is silent or 
ambiguous on an issue within a statute.113  When this occurs, 
109 Id. at 472. The D.C. Court of Appeals determined that the provision “failed to 
state intelligibly how much is too much.” Id. (quoting Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. 
EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1999), modified, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). 
110 Id. at 472–74. 
111 See id.; see also Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160 (1991). 
112 The doctrine is named after Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). In Chevron, the Court held that the 
Environmental Protection Agency’s interpretation of the term “stationary source” 
was reasonable in the absence of an explicit definition from Congress. Id. at 840–41, 
865–66. The Court reached its conclusion by creating a two-step analysis of an 
agency’s interpretation of a statute. Id. at 842–43. The first step is to determine 
whether a statute is ambiguous. Id. If it is, then the second step is to determine 
whether the agency’s interpretation of that statute is reasonable. Id. at 843. This 
analysis rests on a presumption that courts should defer to the agency’s 
interpretation instead of creating their own. Id. at 844. 
113 Id. at 844–45. 
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courts defer to the agency’s interpretation of the statute so long 
as it is reasonable, instead of substituting their own 
interpretation of the statue.114  There are many constitutional 
and administrative law issues associated with Chevron that are 
beyond the scope of this Note.  However, Chevron deference is 
important because it has allowed administrative agencies to 
change policy goals articulated by Congress.115  Combined with 
Mistretta’s lax rearticualtion of the intelligible principle, the 
Court has allowed administrative agencies to assume 
tremendous discretion and authority when promulgating laws, 
thus eliminating congressional accountability and raising 
concerns over separation of powers. 
The Court’s rearticulation and subsequent application of the 
intelligible principle in Mistretta shows that the intelligible 
principle is a dead standard for nondelegation jurisprudence.  In 
fact, since Whitman, the Court has been virtually silent on the 
issue of congressional delegations.116  It was not until the Court’s 
2015 decision in Department of Transportation v. Ass’n of 
American Railroads117 that the nondelegation doctrine 
resurfaced, in large part due to a lengthy concurrence by Justice 
Thomas.118  In Department of Transportation v. Ass’n of American 
Railroads, the Association challenged Congress’ delegation of 
authority to Amtrak to issue “metrics and standards” that 
address the performance and scheduling of passenger railroad 
services.119  The Association argued that because Amtrak was a 
private entity any congressional delegation to Amtrak was 
unconstitutional,120 but the Court concluded that Amtrak was a 
government entity.121  However, instead of then determining 
114 Id. at 843. 
115 See Schoenbrod, supra note 69, at 1242–43. 
116 From Whitman to the present, the Court has mentioned either nondelegation 
or the intelligible principle in only nine cases, none of them ruling on a delegation 
challenge. See Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2575 (2015) (Alito, J., 
dissenting); Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R.s, 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1234 (2015); 
Reynolds v. United States, 565 U.S. 432, 438 (2012); Sykes v. United States, 564 
U.S. 1, 15–16 (2011), overruled by Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015); 
Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. and Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 56 (2011); 
Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 842–43 (2010). 
117 135 S. Ct. 1225 (2015). 
118 See id. at 1240–52 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
119 Id. at 1228 (majority opinion). 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
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whether the statute granting Amtrak the authority to issue 
“metrics and standards” was a permissible delegation of 
authority, the Court remanded the case because the Court of 
Appeals had not ruled on the issue, thereby avoiding the 
opportunity to evaluate the merits of nondelegation and its 
application.122 
C. The Disappearance of Conditional Legislation
Finally, the third way the United States Supreme Court
contributed to the breakdown of the intelligible principle was its 
retreat from conditional legislation as a factor in measuring 
congressional delegation.  Since A.L.A. Schechter Poultry, there 
has been no call by the Court in nondelegation cases for agencies 
to satisfy some prerequisite before they can begin promulgating 
rules.123  Instead, the Court has allowed Congress to delegate 
purely legislative authority to agencies without first requiring 
that the agencies make some type of factual determination. 
As discussed earlier, J.W. Hampton did delegate legislative 
power to the President by allowing him to fix new tariff rates, 
even though the Court viewed this as simply executing Congress’ 
policy and plan.124  However, in J.W. Hampton, the President had 
to determine whether the differences in the current rates were 
unequal, and only then could he fix new rates as he deemed 
necessary.125  This factual determination as a prerequisite to the 
President exercising legislative authority was a type of 
conditional legislation, and in both Panama Refining Co. and 
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry, the Court referenced the fact that
conditional legislation should be included when Congress is
122 Id. 
123 Only Justice Thomas has expressed such desire in his concurring opinion in 
Department of Transportation. Id. at 1246–48 (Thomas, J., concurring). In Clinton v. 
City of New York, the government argued that the Line Item Veto was contingent 
legislation similar to the conditional legislation in Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 
143 U.S. 649 (1892). 524 U.S. 417, 442–45 (1998). The Court rejected this argument, 
concluding that the issue in the case was not a question of permissible delegation 
but rather that the Line Item Veto violated Article I, § 7. Id. at 444. However, 
Justice Breyer argued that the Line Item Veto was constitutional and that the 
“power the Act grants the President to prevent spending items from taking effect 
does not violate the ‘nondelegation’ doctrine.” Id. at 490 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
124 See supra Section II.B. 
125 J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 405–06 (1928). 
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delegating its authority.126  Unfortunately, by abandoning this 
requirement, the Court weakened the intelligible principle by 
making it easier for Congress to delegate purely legislative—and 
virtually unrestricted—authority.  This is a major failure of the 
Court because it undermines the separation of powers, which is 
one of the essential principles of nondelegation. 
The Court’s upholding of broad policy objectives and 
boundless agency authority, combined with its inaccurate 
rearticualtion of the intelligible principle in Mistretta and the 
removal of conditional legislation all greatly contributed to the 
breakdown of the intelligible principle.  While today the 
intelligible principle is largely dead, a reformulation of the 
standard can breathe life into nondelegation and bring the 
doctrine back to its constitutional roots. 
IV. THE NEW-OLD INTELLIGIBLE PRINCIPLE
The original intelligible principle test under J.W. Hampton, 
Panama Refining Co., and A.L.A. Schechter Poultry required the 
United States Supreme Court to look for three factors to 
determine whether Congress permissibly delegated authority to 
the executive branch: (1) a detailed policy objective in the 
underlying statute; (2) a plan by which the executive was to carry 
out that objective; and (3) a finding made by the executive prior 
to using his delegated authority.127  Over the last eighty years, 
these factors have collapsed, moving from a detailed policy and 
plan to a general one and removing any type of conditional 
legislation.  The new standard proposed in this Note draws 
mainly on the original understanding of the intelligible principle, 
which is why the standard keeps the name “intelligible principle” 
instead of fashioning a new term to measure congressional 
delegation.  This new standard varies from the original 
intelligible principle because it acknowledges the changes in 
regards to both the size and scope of the government since the 
1930’s, namely administrative agencies, and therefore attempts 
to strike a balance by reviving the doctrine in a modern form. 
126 Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 415 (1935); A.L.A. Schechter 
Poultry v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541–42 (1935). 
127 Panama Refining Co., 293 U.S. at 415; A.L.A. Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 
541–42; J.W. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 405–06. 
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A. New Three-Part Standard
The new intelligible principle standard can be broken down
into three requirements: (1) specific policy objectives; 
(2) conditional legislation; and (3) measurable boundaries of
authority.  Each requirement draws on the original 
interpretation of the intelligible principle from J.W. Hampton, 
Panama Refining Co., and A.L.A. Schechter Poultry and attempts 
to bring back the original understanding of the nondelegation 
doctrine. 
1. Specific Policy Objectives
The first requirement for the new intelligible principle is
that Congress must articulate specific policy objectives.  This 
would directly overrule the current standard from Mistretta, 
which only calls for Congress to provide a general policy.  A 
specific policy objective would require Congress to clearly state a 
goal that the delegated agency is to accomplish, which cannot be 
subject to multiple interpretations.  For example, the public 
interest standard would not survive this requirement, because it 
is too broad and can be easily manipulated by the agency 
exercising the authority to promulgate rules to meet that 
objective.  Similarly, the “public health” and “public safety” 
objectives from Whitman and Touby would also fail under this 
requirement for being too ambiguous.  However, in Mistretta, the 
Sentencing Commission’s objective was not only to create 
guidelines consistent with the purposes of sentencing,128 but also 
to provide certainty and fairness in sentencing to avoid 
disparities among similar defendants and crimes committed.129  
These two objectives would meet the specificity requirement 
because it is possible to determine whether the Commission has 
met these objectives by looking to the sentencing data itself to 
determine fairness rather than having the Commission speculate 
on what it considers to be fair. 
2. Conditional Legislation
The second requirement is a variation on conditional
legislation that was the standard of nondelegation in early cases. 
This requirement calls on Congress to have administrative 
128 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2012). 
129 28 U.S.C. § 991(b) (2012). 
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agencies make some type of factual determination about an issue 
before it can begin to promulgate rules.  This is a variation on 
conditional legislation because it is not suggesting that Congress 
has to create every rule and only use agencies to execute those 
rules.  Instead, it acknowledges that in today’s society it would be 
impossible for Congress to create every rule, and so it authorizes 
agencies to exercise legislative authority.  However, as a 
prerequisite to exercising that legislative authority, Congress 
must build into the statute some type of condition that will 
trigger the agency’s authority. 
This trigger could, like in J.W. Hampton, allow an agency to 
promulgate rules after it determines that a current practice is 
unequal or is contrary to a known and measurable policy 
objective.  The type of determination required may be 
discretionary, but it would nonetheless be rooted in some type of 
factual basis to justify an agency’s decision.  For example, in 
Field, the factual determination the President had to make was 
whether certain countries imposed duties that were “reciprocally 
unequal and unreasonable.”130  While “unreasonable” is a 
discretionary term, “unequal” is a fixed standard, and therefore 
the President could only suspend free importation if a foreign 
country’s duties were not equal to the duties in the United 
States.131  Requiring this type of conditional legislation as a 
prerequisite will serve as a barrier, preventing an agency from 
using its delegated authority in situations where it is not 
warranted, and ensures that it is Congress’ underlying authority 
that controls the agency’s ability to exercise any legislative 
function. 
3. Measurable Boundaries of Agency Authority
The third requirement pulls on a variety of factors to
determine whether Congress has provided sufficient boundaries 
of authority that the agencies are confined to.  Like the first 
requirement calling for specificity, a requirement of measurable 
boundaries of authority means that Congress cannot leave an 
agency unfettered discretion in achieving its policy objectives. 
For example, in Mistretta, Congress provided the Sentencing 
Commission various factors it needed to consider to create the 
130 Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 680 (1892). 
131 Id. 
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sentencing guidelines, and even provided a guideline system that 
the Commission needed to conform to.132  This satisfies the 
requirement because the Court can easily determine whether the 
Commission exceeded its delegated authority.  For example, the 
Commission would be found to have exceeded its authority if it 
considered factors outside those articulated by Congress, or if it 
did not conform to the guideline system provided.133  In contrast, 
the statute at issue in Whitman would fail this requirement—in 
addition to failing the first requirement—because the boundary 
of achieving its goal of protecting the public health was at a level 
the agency deemed “requisite,” which is a highly subjective and 
limitless standard.134  The Court would not be able to determine 
whether the EPA exceeded its delegated authority and therefore 
would find that Congress did not articulate a clearly defined 
boundary of authority. 
Because providing measurable bounds of authority could 
itself be considered a flexible standard, the Court must consider 
two factors that would narrow the scope of Congress’ delegable 
authority thereby increasing Congress’ responsibility to ensure 
that its statutes do not delegate unrestricted authority to 
agencies.  First, the Court must consider whether Congress has 
mandated part of the agency’s daily operations.  Mandating daily 
operations requires Congress to carefully examine agency 
functions and removes agency discretion in favor of statutory 
requirements.  An example of such action can be found in 
Department of Transportation v. Ass’n of American Railroads, in 
which the Court found that Congress had mandated aspects of 
Amtrak’s day-to-day operations in its underlying statute by 
132 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 374–76 (1989). 
133 Under the new intelligible principle standard, Mistretta would survive a 
nondelegation challenge on the issue of whether Congress sufficiently prescribed the 
limits of the Sentencing Commission’s authority. However, there is a separate issue, 
discussed  Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion, that Congress’ delegation to the 
Sentencing Commission was unconstitutional because it created a “junior-varsity 
Congress” within the judicial branch. Id. at 427 (Scalia, J., dissenting). On this 
issue, Mistretta may not survive a delegation challenge because delegating 
legislative authority to the judiciary is a clear violation of the separation of powers 
doctrine. For the purposes of this Note, Mistretta is used as an example of how 
Congress could satisfy the new intelligible principle irrespective of the separation of 
powers issue. Had Congress delegated the authority to create new sentencing 
guidelines to the Department of Justice or another administrative agency within the 
executive branch, then Congress clearly would have been within its authority to 
delegate. 
134 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 473–74 (2001). 
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requiring Amtrak to maintain certain transportation routes.135  
Requiring Congress to mandate an agency’s daily functions is an 
important addition to the intelligible principle because it places 
greater restrictions on an agency’s legislative authority by 
removing some of that power and simultaneously increases 
congressional oversight and accountability. 
Second, when the Court has to consider whether an agency 
acted in accordance with its delegated authority in the context of 
Chevron deference, the Court should reject the presumption of 
administrative deference that has allowed agencies to exercise 
immense discretion when promulgating rules.  Under this new 
standard, when Congress has not explicitly delegated authority 
to an agency on a particular issue, the Court should not engage 
in determining whether the agency’s interpretation of the statute 
is a reasonable one as it currently does under Chevron.  Instead, 
the Court should rule that Congress did not intend the agency to 
exercise authority on that issue.  Requiring the Court to find 
against administrative deference will put pressure on Congress 
to explicitly state an agency’s boundary of authority.  If Congress 
fails to do so, then the agency cannot exercise that authority and 
Congress must amend the statute or provide some other 
alternative if it wishes the agency to have such authority.136 
While this new three-part intelligible principle strays from 
the original meaning of nondelegation, it strays out of necessity 
and not out of blindness.  The goal of this new intelligible 
principle is to hold Congress to a higher standard and ensure 
that any delegation of legislative authority to administrative 
agencies is as close to the original intelligible principle as 
possible, while accounting for the dramatic changes to our 
governmental structure.  Under this new standard, agencies will 
have more direction and focus when promulgating rules. 
Additionally, because Congress will be responsible for giving 
135 Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R.s, 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1232 (2015). 
136 The applicability of Chevron deference was recently questioned in King v. 
Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). In determining that Congress did not intend for the 
Internal Revenue Service to have authority in crafting health insurance policies, the 
Court first noted that “[i]n extraordinary cases . . . there may be reason to hesitate 
before concluding that Congress has intended such an implicit delegation.” Id. at 
2488–89 (citation omitted). The Court then suggested that deference to 
administrative agencies may not apply in “question[s] of deep ‘economic and political 
significance’ . . . had Congress wished to assign that question to an agency, it surely 
would have done so expressly.” Id. at 2489. 
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detailed objectives and guidelines to the agencies, it will be easier 
to hold Congress accountable if the rules fail or have adverse 
effects on the public. 
B. How the New Intelligible Principle is Different from Other
Proposals for Nondelegation Reform
The intelligible principle has been around for almost a
century, and as a result there have been many attempts to revive 
the standard and reform nondelegation jurisprudence.  However, 
none of the proposed reforms address the congressional 
delegations with the breadth that this new three-part standard 
proposes.  For example, in his concurring opinion in Department 
of Transportation v. Ass’n of American Railroads, Justice Thomas 
advocated a “return to the original understanding of the federal 
legislative power [to] require that the Federal Government create 
generally applicable rules of private conduct only through the 
constitutionally prescribed legislative process.”137  To Justice 
Thomas’ displeasure, Congress cannot by itself make all of the 
rules and regulations and only delegate authority to agencies to 
execute those rules.  That is impractical today and would shut 
down the government, a fact that the Court has repeatedly 
realized throughout nondelegation jurisprudence.138  The simple 
truth is that administrative agencies are needed to promulgate 
rules, but that does not mean agencies should have unlimited 
discretion in the quality and quantity of rules they develop, 
which is what the current intelligible principle allows.  The 
second requirement of the new intelligible principle addresses 
this through conditional legislation from a modern perspective. 
Recognizing that delegation of legislative authority has existed 
since J.W. Hampton, the standard requires agencies exercising 
such authority to make some type of factual—and likely semi-
discretionary—determination before it can begin promulgating 
laws. 
Additionally, some scholars argue for a flexible approach to 
nondelegation, in which the original meaning of the Constitution 
supports a strict application of the doctrine in most cases, but 
137 Ass’n of Am. R.R.s, 135 S. Ct. at 1246 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
138 See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
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does not apply to “certain selected parts of the law.”139  Others 
argue that the test for delegation should be whether the 
delegated authority relates to a matter of basic importance or is 
ancillary to the statutory scheme.140  However, these approaches 
to nondelegation are still too ambiguous and can lead to inconsist 
applications.  Allowing the executive branch the discretion to 
implement ancillary matters of a statute but not matters of basic 
importance raises the questions as to what matters will be 
defined as ancillary and what matters will be defined as of basic 
importance.  Those terms better align with the current ambiguity 
already allowed in nondelegation jurisprudence, and therefore 
any nondelegation analysis would look similar to the current 
practice of the Court allowing ambiguity to stand in favor of 
efficiency.  The new three-part standard does not distinguish 
between matters, but instead takes the position that all 
delegation of legislative authority must be measured uniformly, 
with the focus being whether Congress was specific enough in 
describing the amount of power the agency can exercise. 
Professor David Schoenbrod believes that “[t]he test of 
permissible delegation should look not to what quantity of power 
a statute confers but to what kind . . . .”141  Schoenbrod argues 
that “the statute itself must speak to what people cannot do; the 
statute may not merely recite regulatory goals and leave it to an 
agency to promulgate the rules to achieve those goals.”142  While 
the new three-part standard incorporates Schoenbrod’s idea that 
Congress cannot simply recite goals that agencies are free to 
create rules to achieve, the new standard differs from Schoenbrod 
because it does not require Congress to state exactly what the 
agencies cannot do.  Instead, if Congress does not explicitly grant 
authority to an agency, it is presumed not to have the ability to 
promulgate in that area.  Since the goal of the intelligible 
139 Michael B. Rappaport, The Selective Nondelegation Doctrine and the Line 
Item Veto: A New Approach to the Nondelegation Doctrine and Its Implications for 
Clinton v. City of New York, 76 TUL. L. REV. 265, 265 (2001). 
140 Lawson, supra note 35, at 334. Lawson argues that an original 
understanding of executive power allows executive officials “to exercise discretion 
with respect to minor or ancillary matters in the implementation of 
statutes . . . [b]ut a statute that leaves to executive (or judicial) discretion matters 
that are of basic importance to the statutory scheme” would create a nondelegation 
problem. Id. 
141 Schoenbrod, supra note 69, at 1227. 
142 Id. 
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principle is to minimize the discretionary power exercised by 
agencies and uphold the separation of powers consistent with the 
original meaning of nondelegation, if Congress were required to 
state everything that an agency cannot do, anything Congress 
did not exclude could be interpreted as a presumptive delegation 
to the agency.  The third requirement of the new intelligible 
principle prevents this interpretation by ensuring that an agency 
does not get the benefit of the doubt when Congress does not 
speak to a certain issue in the statute. 
Finally, there have recently been calls for a heightened 
intelligible principle standard by simply reversing the Chevron 
presumption that ambiguity within a statute equals 
congressional delegation.143  By reversing this presumption, 
“courts would hold that delegation could only take place 
narrowly—when Congress has clearly delineated the standard 
that it intends the agency to achieve.”144  However, while 
reversing the Chevron presumption of administrative deference 
would certainly be a means of eliminating an agency’s ability to 
create its own interpretations of statutes, it would “merely shift 
discretion from the independent agency to the reviewing 
court . . . to determine when Congress has or has not spoken 
authoritatively.”145  This still leaves the potential for courts to 
uphold broad statutory language, something that the intelligible 
principle is meant to prevent.  Therefore, built into the third part 
of the new standard is not only a call for the reversal of Chevron 
deference, but also a call for Congress to directly address any 
ambiguity of whether or not the agency has authority to act on a 
particular issue, instead of relying on the Court to determine 
Congress’ intent. 
Ultimately, the new intelligible principle is a viable standard 
for nondelegation cases because it is multi-dimensional, 
requiring courts to give a comprehensive examination of what 
exactly Congress has delegated to an agency.  Should the Court 
adopt this new intelligible principle standard, it will be a  
143 See Casazza, supra note 36, at 755–56. 
144 Id. at 756. Casazza goes on to say that under this new approach, “[T]he 
delegation in J.W. Hampton, which required only calculation and adjustment of a 
tariff based on fluctuating prices, would stand while the delegation in Whitman, 
which asked the agency to restrict pollutants to the level ‘requisite to protect public 
health’ without defining public health . . . would fail.” Id. 
145 Id. at 757. 
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significant step towards maintaining accountability and the 
separation of powers doctrine that are central to the 
nondelegation doctrine. 
CONCLUSION 
The nondelegation doctrine stands as the foundation of the 
United States Constitution’s Vesting Clause, and the intelligible 
principle standard was intended to give the United States 
Supreme Court power to uphold the doctrine and its 
Constitutional underpinnings.  But over the last eighty years, the 
standard has crumbled, allowing Congress “to avoid hard 
choices” by passing the legislative responsibility to 
administrative agencies that do not derive their authority from 
the consent of the public.146  The Supreme Court has repeatedly 
shown that the intelligible principle is little more than a speed 
bump that Congress must pass over on its way to delegating 
essentially unrestricted legislative authority, effectually 
undermining the purposes of the nondelegation doctrine and the 
separation of powers.  The new three-part intelligible principle 
attempts to bring the standard as close as possible to its 
constitutional roots while simultaneously ensuring that the 
government can still function in today’s complex administrative 
state. 
146 See Schoenbrod, supra note 69, at 1225. 
